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The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal 
trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by their 
decisions than by those of all the courts . . . .     
    − FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952)
Consider the following two arguments in favor of adopting a “legislation 
and regulation” or “regulatory state” (“leg-reg”) course in the first year of law 
school: 
1.  One of the basic aims of the first year of law school is to provide an overview 
of the modern legal system and the general skills necessary to function as a 
lawyer today.1  In light of those goals, a leg-reg course is a critical component of 
the first year and has been for many years.2 That we live in an “age of statutes” 
is old news;3 indeed, in our current era, regulations and decisions issued 
by administrative agencies leave as deep a mark on our law as legislation. 
If law and legal practice is dominated by statutes and agencies as primary 
implementers of statutes, then a general introduction to these materials and 
institutions deserves a place in the first year of law school.4
2.  A basic goal of the first year is to provide students with the knowledge and 
skills necessary and helpful to understanding the more specialized courses of 
1. See Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Landell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 Vand. L. ReV. 
609, 651 (2007). 
2. Id. at 622 (“The first-year, common-law curriculum simply does not reflect the impact of 
the administrative state. . . . The failure to integrate [statutory and regulatory law] into that 
curriculum disconnects it from the basic of modern practice in a manner that betrays that 
curriculum’s intention. . . .”).
3. See, e.g., Guido CaLabResi, a Common Law foR the aGe of statutes 1-2, 183 (1982) (“All 
agree that modern American law is dominated by statutes.”).
4. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 1, at 651; Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year 
Curriculum, 58 J. LeGaL eduC. 166, 169-72 (2008); James J. Brudney, Legislation and Regulation in 
the Core Curriculum: A Virtue or a Necessity?, J. LeGaL. eduC. 3, 6-16 (2015).
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their second and third years of law school.5 It is widely observed that law and 
legal practice are increasingly specialized.6 Clusters of statutes, agencies, and 
regulations play an important role in defining those specialties and shaping 
how they are taught in law school. As a result, an introduction to statutes, 
agencies, and forms of regulation provides critical context and skills for the 
more specialized statutory and regulatory studies in upper-level courses. 
These arguments both strike me as persuasive. What is puzzling is that these 
same arguments could have been confidently pressed more than 70 years ago—
or, in line with the Supreme Court’s suggestion in my epigraph, considerably 
before that. This extraordinary length of time, especially relative to the life of 
legal education in the United States, suggests that something more than well-
worn stories of faculty inertia or student distaste with things “administrative” 
is at work in the slow pace of adoption of a leg-reg course in the first year.
To gain some insight and critical perspective, this essay looks back to 
the arguments and debates stirred by the incorporation into the law school 
curriculum of a related course that appeared exotic and now is a mainstay: 
a credit-bearing class in administrative law. At the turn of the 20th century, a 
small cluster of scholars—Frank Goodnow, Ernst Freund, and Bruce Wyman—
charted the first definitions and accounts of administrative law (so called) in 
the United States, taught the first courses in the subject, and produced its first 
teaching materials.
A brief look back at their conceptions of the field, and the resistance it 
met, informs the debate over leg-reg courses in three ways. First, these early 
scholars’ arguments for administrative law, made a century or more ago, add 
further urgency to adoption of a first-year leg-reg course today. The resonance 
of their arguments in the debate today shows how slowly legal education has 
progressed, and how far we yet have to go, in synchronizing the “law” of law 
school with the true dimensions of the legal order. Second, returning to these 
early works provides a vantage point on the material to be covered in a leg-reg 
course. There is a strong argument that part of what was left on the cutting-
room floor in the debate over what would be taught as part of “administrative 
law”—the coverage of agency decision-making and internal administrative 
law—deserves a prominent place in today’s first-year leg-reg courses. A first-
year course with coverage of the primary sources agencies produce and 
examination of how agencies make decisions not only brings the first-year 
curriculum closer to capturing this critical aspect of lawmaking today, but also 
provides the groundwork for upper-level courses, including an upper-level 
course in administrative law focused on judicial review.
5. See Leib, supra note 4, at 171; Brudney, supra note 4, at 21-25 (2015).
6. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of Law in the Administrative State, 11 teL aViV u. stud. L. 9, 9 (1992) 
(“Probably the most common observation American lawyers make about American law is 
that it is increasingly specialized.”); Rubin, supra note 1, at 657 (noting specialization as a 
condition of American law). Professor Rakoff’s article includes a helpful diagram depicting 
this specialization. See Rakoff, supra, at 6.  
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Finally, examining the sources of resistance to these early courses exposes 
deeper grounds for the continued wariness about a first-year leg-reg course in 
a jurisprudence for which the case method is the privileged pedagogy. Indeed, 
the recrudescence of interest in arguments that all administrative regulations 
and decisions are not law or “unlawful”7 might have more to do with the failure 
of law schools to provide a portrait of law that reflects its current form than the 
wholesale illegality of the administrative state. 
I. “Administrative Law” at the Turn of the Twentieth Century
Scholars at the turn of the 20th century made a powerful and simple 
argument for the increasing importance of administrative law. Based on the 
premise that the legislatures were creating more and more administrative 
bodies and had vested them with greater powers to reach binding decisions, 
it follows that the law governing how agencies and public officers act, and the 
remedies private parties could seek from them—what these scholars came to 
call “administrative law”—would play an ever more important role for lawyers. 
Moreover, as these scholars recognized the centrality of this distinctive branch 
of public law, they also sought to introduce it into the law school curriculum.
A. The Rise of the Administrative State and Administrative Law
One of the earliest and most forceful statements of the relevance of 
administrative bodies and the law that governed them is found in the work of 
Frank Goodnow, who held a joint appointment in law and political science at 
Columbia University.8 In 1893, Goodnow produced a two-volume monograph 
comparing the administrative structures in the United States with those of 
England, France and Germany.9 Goodnow’s book convincingly argues for the 
centrality of an administrative law that his work helped to define, and does so 
in terms that speak directly to the grounds for a first-year leg-reg course today. 
Goodnow launches his book with a declaration that could have been pulled 
from the preface of any of the current course books for leg-reg classes:  “A 
detailed consideration of the directions of administrative action, as well of 
its methods, is . . . a necessity for the practicing lawyer.”10 As we do today, 
7. See, e.g., PhiLiP hambuRGeR, is administRatiVe Law unLawfuL? (2014). Professor Adrian 
Vermeule’s review of Professor Hamburger’s book pointedly confronts the book’s denial 
of the administrative state’s legality. See Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 tex. L. ReV. 1547 (2015) 
(review of PhiLiP hambuRGeR, is administRatiVe Law unLawfuL?).
8. wiLLiam C. Chase, the ameRiCan Law sChooL and the Rise of administRatiVe 
GoVeRnment 48-49 (1982).
9. fRank J. Goodnow, ComPaRatiVe administRatiVe Law:  an anaLysis of the administRatiVe 
systems nationaL and LoCaL, of the united states, enGLand, fRanCe and GeRmany, 
VoLs. i & ii (1893) (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons).
10. See Goodnow, supra note 9, at iv; compare with, e.g., Lisa sChuLtz bRessman, edwaRd L. 
Rubin, & keVin m. staCk, the ReGuLatoRy state xxi-xxii (2nd ed. 2013) (“Statutes and 
regulations are paramount in this book because they are principal sources of law in our 
modern regulatory state. . . . [T]he principal goal is practical: to provide an introduction to 
the laws and institutions lawyers confront in their practices every day.”). 
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Goodnow connects the centrality of administrative law to the demands on 
and developments of modern government. “Our modern complex social 
conditions,” Goodnow writes, “are making enormous demands of the 
administrative side of the government, demands which will not be satisfied 
at all or which will be inadequately met unless a greater knowledge of 
administrative law” is gained.11 In a few compact pages, Goodnow defends 
administration as a necessary function of government. For Goodnow, 
“administration” is the catch-all category of government action that falls 
outside the work of the legislature and courts.12 “Whenever we see the 
government in action as opposed to deliberation or the rendering of a judicial 
decision, there we say is administration.”13 In this sense, “administration” is to 
be found in all the manifestations of executive action, from the appointment 
of officers, the assessment and collection of taxes, the training of an army, and 
the investigation of a crime to the execution of a judgment.14 
With this definition of administration as “the function of execution”—which 
encompasses the chief executive and his “most humble . . . subordinates”15—
Goodnow’s argument for the centrality of administrative law unfolds easily, 
though the term was unfamiliar at the time. Goodnow concedes that while 
there is wide acknowledgment of the functions of administration, “there is 
hardly an American or English lawyer who would recognize the existence of a 
branch of law called administrative law.”16
Goodnow attributes this blind spot to an overreading of Professor Albert 
Venn Dicey’s widely quoted declaration that “in England and in countries 
which, like the United States, derive their civilization from English sources, 
the system of administrative law and the very principles on which it rests are 
unknown.”17 Dicey served as the Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford 
and a fellow of All Souls from 1882 until 1909, and his Law of the Constitution 
is viewed as one of the most important books on public law in the common 
law tradition—and is also widely misunderstood.18 Goodnow explains that 
in Dicey’s notorious passage distancing administrative law from the English 
legal tradition, Dicey simply meant to deny the reception of a particular form 
of the French droit administratif into English law, not the existence of a law 
which “governs the relations of the executive and administrative authorities of 
11. See Goodnow, supra note 9, at iv. 
12. Id. at 1-2. 
13. Id. at 2. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 5. 
16. Id. at 6. 
17. See Goodnow, supra note 9, at 6 (quoting a.V. diCey, the Law of the Constitution (3rd 
ed. 304-05)). 
18. See Mark D. Walters, Dicey on Writing the Law of the Constitution, 32 oxfoRd. J. of LeG. stud. 21 
(2012). 
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government.”19 In this larger sense, Goodnow argued, administrative law is an 
inevitable aspect of the state and operates as a supplement and complement to 
constitutional law.20 Whereas constitutional law sets the general organization 
of the state, administrative law “fixes the organization of administrative 
authorities” and “indicates what are the rights of the individual which the 
administration must respect.”21 With an expanding set of tasks taken on by 
government, it would be difficult to deny the centrality of the law that applies 
to “government in action” for the lawyer and the citizen. 
Goodnow was hardly alone in recognizing the critical role of administrative 
law in the modern state and for contemporary lawyers. Goodnow’s student 
Ernst Freund, who had a long tenure at the University of Chicago, and 
Harvard’s Bruce Wyman also offered definitions of the field of administrative 
law—and defended its centrality. In an 1894 article, Freund joined Goodnow 
in arguing for acceptance of administrative law as a distinct field of public 
law.22 For Freund, administrative law “regulates and limits government action 
without involving constitutional questions;” its subject matter is “public affairs” 
outside of legislation and the jurisdiction of the courts.23 Like Goodnow, Freund 
saw the importance of this law as tied to the expanding powers of federal 
administration.24 The Constitution, Freund observed, grants broad discretion 
to the legislature to act; of the numerous statutes enacted, “the largest number 
regulate, in some respect, [to] the administration of the government, creating 
official powers or duties.”25 With the basic premise that executive lawmaking 
was on the rise, it again follows easily that the law setting the constraints on 
these new administrative functions was all the more important.26 In step with 
Goodnow, Freund also “hoped that the term [administrative law] will become 
more familiar to the public, and especially to the legal profession, than it is 
as present.”27 In the same short span of years, the newly minted Harvard Law 
19. Goodnow, supra note 9, at 7; see also Edmund M. Parker, State and Official Immunity, 19 haRV. 
L. ReV. 335, 336 (1906) (arguing that reading full discussion of Dicey’s chapter on droit 
administratif makes clear he did not intend to deny that general common law governed the 
duties of officials, and that he should not be so misread). 
20. Goodnow, supra note 9, at 8. 
21. Id. 
22. Ernst Freund, The Law of Administration in America, 9 PoL. sCi. Q. 403 (1894).
23. Id. at 404. 
24. Id. at 408 (“Of course the peculiar sphere of federal administration aided this development 
very materially”).
25. Id. at 403. 
26. Interestingly, Freund also observed another phenomenon with strong contemporary 
relevance—the increase of the president’s powers over administration, which “amount at the 
present time to a substantial direction of national administration.” Id. at 408. With extensive 
powers over personnel, Freund notices, “a strong executive naturally became the depository 
of extensive delegated statutory powers.” Id.
27. Id. at 404. 
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School faculty member Bruce Wyman28 schematized administrative law as a 
field in similar terms,29 and defended its place as constitutional law’s coordinate 
branch of public law in his 1903 treatise based on his lectures in administrative 
law.30
B. Introducing Instruction in “Administrative Law”
Recognizing the importance of administrative bodies and thus 
“administrative law,” these scholars also sought to introduce this material to 
law students and lawyers.  Goodnow, Wyman, and Freund all produced books 
that could be used for instructional purposes or were adapted from them.31  
One of the most striking features of these treatments is how their coverage 
differs from current conventional coverage in administrative law. Three 
differences in their proposed coverage are most relevant for the coverage of 
a leg-reg course. First, these early writers recognized and taught the role of 
law internal to administration. Wyman’s The Principles of the Administrative Law 
provides a robust treatment of the set of constraints internal to the executive 
branch.32 Wyman classified administrative law as having two elements, an 
“external administrative law” that pertains to the relations of officials to 
citizens, and “an internal administrative law” that concerns the relations of 
officers with one another:33  
Internal law addresses “the fact that many officers are bound together in 
action,” and thus seeks to expose “the position of the officer in his organization 
and his function in its action.” (14) The internal law thus concerns the 
allocation of authority among the many actors within the agency and the 
practices by which their individual actions constitute a collective action on 
behalf of the entity. Wyman acknowledges that this internal law is in part 
positive, something discernible as a social fact or institutional practice. The 
difficulty in studying administration, Wyman remarks, is “the problem is as 
often institutional as it is legal.” (22) The “proper relations of the officials in 
the administration is the institutional problem.” (23) But the internal law still 
has normative content; it is concerned with the “proper” relations of officials 
(23), “whether there has been proper or improper administration.” (20) The 
internal law thus is the set of norms, procedures and practices that structure 
and unite activities of officers into proper collective action.34
28. bRuCe wyman, the PRinCiPLes of the administRatiVe Law GoVeRninG the ReLations of 
PubLiC offiCeRs, with new intRoduCtion by keVin m. staCk iii (1903) (republished with 
new introduction 2014). 
29. See wyman, supra note 28.
30. Id. at 23. 
31. See Goodnow, supra note 9; wyman, supra note 28; eRnst fReund, Cases on administRatiVe 
Law (1911). 
32. See generally wyman, supra note 28.
33. Id. at 4. 
34. wyman, supra note 28, at xvi-xvii (quoting Stack’s Introduction) (with references in 
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As Professor Jerry Mashaw has emphasized, this “internal administrative 
law” has not been the focus of contemporary administrative law scholarship, 
despite its importance to administrative legality.35 Outside of coverage of the 
presidents’ executive orders providing for regulatory review,36 this internal law 
also does not figure prominently in most administrative law courses today.  
Second, Freund emphasized both the role of legislation and public 
administration, including the methods agencies use to make decisions, as 
critical features of administrative law. Because exercises of administrative 
power must be authorized by legislation, Freund made clear that statutory 
construction was to be a central occupation for administrative law.37 “[T]he 
operation of general principles of administrative law is constantly affected, 
and frequently controlled by, the language of statutes.”38 As a result, Freund 
emphasized that statutory construction thus deserved a prominent place in a 
course on administrative law.39 Indeed, Freund argued, in light of the “rapid and 
enormous growth of public regulation of all kinds,” that principles of statutory 
construction are “as deserving of careful study as common-law principles.”40 
Statutory interpretation has been a constant occupation of administrative law, 
but frequently only in the context of review of executive action. The current 
iterations of leg-reg courses generally answer this call more systematically 
than administrative law courses. In other writing, Freund also argued for a 
greater presence of policy analysis, what we might call public administration, 
of the methodology of agency decision-making within law schools’ coverage.41 
Freund bemoaned the identification of the field of administrative law with 
judicial decisions.42 What this did in law teaching, in Freund’s view, was 
parentheses to the pages of Wyman’s treatise). 
35. See JeRRy L. mashaw, CReatinG the administRatiVe Constitution: the Lost one 
hundRed yeaRs of ameRiCan administRatiVe Law 222-23 (2012); Peter L. Strauss, Rules, 
Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior Department’s 
Administration of Mining Law, 74 CoLum. L. ReV. 1231, 1233 (1974) (emphasizing importance of 
internal law within the agency) Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA 
and Beyond, 103 Geo. L.J. 259, 268-70 (2015) (calling for the development of a jurisprudence 
that addresses the legal constraints, beyond the courts, on administrative activity); Daniel 
A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 tex. L. ReV. 1137 
(2014) (calling attention to the importance of administrative law and practice beyond the 
cognizance of the Administrative Procedure Act). 
36. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993). 




41. Ernst Freund, The Correlation of Work for Higher Degrees in Graduate Schools and Law Schools, 11 iLL. L. 
ReV. 301, 306-08 (1916) [hereinafter Freund, Correlation].
42. Id., see also Daniel R.  Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, and the American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic 
Shipwreck, 1894-1932, 23 studies in am. PoL. deV. 171, 175 (2009) (noting sources in which 
Freud recognized “law could arise outside the courts”). 
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leave “no room for the constructive aspect of public law” that should guide 
policymaking under broad standards.43 Principles of common law and equity 
were “by no means adequate guidance to needed readjustments of legal 
relations” brought about by modern legislation.44 In this respect, Freund 
urged the incorporation of social science into law schools.45
Finally, for these early writers and teachers, administrative law had a greater 
horizontal scope than it does today. They treat subjects that clearly involve 
the law governing the executive but have fallen outside of the coverage of 
most administrative law courses. For instance, both Goodnow and Wyman 
include extensive treatment of criminal prosecution by public officials.46 They 
also included treatment of the executive conduct of foreign affairs.47 This 
treatment follows from a comprehensive assessment of the law governing 
executive officers, as both foreign affairs and criminal enforcement implicate 
the executive. The treatment of these topics has been carved out of the analysis 
of administrative law, with a few notable exceptions,48 and out of its course 
coverage. While these subjects long have been elevated to separate fields and 
courses, their contemporary convergence within national security agencies 
today, which implicate criminal procedure rights and foreign affairs doctrines 
at the same time,49 at least prompts the question of what is lost in the isolation 
of these areas from a general law of executive constraint. 
II. Resistance to Administrative Law
These early scholars appeared to have an unassailable argument for the 
importance of administrative law. Based on the premise that statutes were 
increasingly granting powers to administrative bodies, it would seem to 
43. Freund, Correlation, at 306; see also Chase, supra note 8, at 96-97; see also eRnst fReund, 
administRatiVe PoweRs oVeR PeRsons and PRoPeRty 29 (1928).
44. Freund, Correlation, supra note 41, at 306.
45. See Freund, Correlation, supra note 41, at 308; see also Rubin, supra note 1, at 654 (arguing that 
underemphasis on social policy represents a serious gap in legal education). 
46. See wyman, supra note 28 (Chapter 10); Goodnow, supra note 9, vol. II, at 178-86. 
47. See wyman, supra note 28, at 104-107; Goodnow, supra note 9, vol. I, at 2. 
48. See, e.g., kenneth CuLP daVis, PoLiCe disCRetion (1975) (examining constraints on the 
police); Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 uCLa L. ReV. 715 (2005) (exploring 
prosecution as a mode of administration); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the 
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 stan. L. ReV. 869 (2009) (same); 
Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Governing Policing, 90 N.Y.U L. ReV. (forthcoming 
2015) (exposing how criminal prosecution has fallen outside of norms and treatment of 
administrative law). For war powers from an administrative perspective, see, e.g., Curtis A. 
Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. ReV. 649 (2000) (examining war powers 
from an administrative perspective); Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 admin. L. 
ReV. 489 (2014) (examining war powers from an administrative perspective).
49. See, e.g., Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military 
Detention Models, 60 stan. L. ReV. 1079 (2008) (arguing that there has been a convergence in 
these two models in process and substantive criteria of detention). 
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follow that administrative law—a body of law that governed the constraints on 
executive action and legal remedies against administrative powers—would have 
relevance for the classroom. Despite the logical and practical force of these 
arguments, the path to adoption of credit-bearing course in administrative 
law was uneven and took nearly a decade. Part of the reason for this delay 
may have been that the underlying premises of a course in administrative law 
sat uneasily with jurisprudential and pedagogical commitments of the time. 
Indeed, those commitments required transformation of the administrative law 
course into one that focused judicial review of agency action. They may also 
undergird the continued reluctance to introduce these aspects of public law to 
first-year students, or at least the continued impression of administrative forms 
of lawmaking as outside the norm despite their ubiquity. 
For our purposes of gaining insight into the sources of resistance to the 
teaching of a leg-reg course in the first year, I treat the rich intellectual climate 
of the era rather crudely, especially in comparison with the luminous histories 
of the era.50 With a pragmatic focus, we can isolate two overlapping sets of ideas 
that help to explain why teaching administrative law appeared exceptional, 
and why the course needed to be normalized into the case method to gain 
acceptance: conceptions of law that marginalized administrative regulations 
(and legislation) and a commitment to instruction exclusively through the 
case method.
A. Is it Law?
At the turn of the 20th century, jurisprudential commitments as to what 
constitutes “law” challenged the critical premise of the argument for the 
importance of administrative law, namely, that administrative bodies were 
lawmakers. 
Perhaps the most prominent and formal expression of this perspective 
took the view that law consists of a set of principles, few in number, which 
existed independent from any judicial or statutory decision. This position is 
widely identified with the first dean of the Harvard Law School, Christopher 
Columbus Langdell.51 One of Langdell’s colleagues and disciples, Professor 
Joseph Beale, also articulates a strong form of this view.52 In line with Langdell, 
Beale argued that law “is not a mere collection of arbitrary rules, but a body 
50. See, e.g., Ernst, supra note 42; Chase, supra note 8; Rubin, supra note 1, at 616-31; neiL duxbuRy, 
PatteRns of ameRiCan JuRisPRudenCe (1995). 
51. Professor Thomas Grey provides a compact account of Langdell’s view of law as a science. 
See Thomas G. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 u. Pitt. L. ReV. 1, 6-13 (1983). One of the most 
famous passages encapsulating Langdell’s view is the following, for which Grey provides 
helpful commentary: “Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or 
doctrines. To have such mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility 
and certainty to ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer;…
[T]he number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than commonly supposed.…” 
ChRistoPheR LanGdeLL, Cases on ContRaCts viii-ix (1st ed. 1871; 2nd ed. 1879). 
52. See Grey, supra note 51, at 34. 
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of scientific principle.”53 As Neil Duxbury explains, if judges were to find, not 
make, the law,54 “the function of changing the law has never been committed 
by the sovereign to the judge, and consciously to make a change in the law 
would be a usurpation on the part of the judge.”55 As a result, for Beale, “the 
decision and judgment of a court . . .  can in no sense be regarded as in itself 
the law.”56  
If the judge cannot change the law, then the law would exist independent 
from the meddling of other institutions as well, such as the legislature and 
administrative bodies. Indeed, for Beale, only rarely would a statute be 
capable of “being assimilated into the common law; ”more typically, a statute 
is “done by haphazard legislation by a legislature chosen not primarily for 
its wisdom.”57 This jurisprudence denies the critical starting premise of the 
argument for administrative law advanced by the early scholars, namely, that 
administrative bodies were increasingly important lawmakers. Without that 
premise, the argument for this new branch of law loses its force.
A second strain of thought at the time took a more positive turn, but was no 
friendlier to administrative actions as a species of law. On this more positivist 
approach, “the Law” is fully identified with judicial decisions. Another 
Harvard Law School faculty member, John Chipman Gray, is the standard 
bearer of this view. For Gray, “The Law of the State or any organized body of 
men is composed of the rules which the courts, that is, the judicial organs of 
that body, lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties.”58 Gray 
distinguishes between sources of law and the Law itself, and considers both 
statutes and administrative rules to be sources of law, but not the Law itself.59 
As statutes do not interpret themselves, Grey writes, “it is with the meaning declared 
by courts, and with no other meaning, that they are imposed upon the community as Law.”60 
53. JosePh h. beaLe, a tReatise on the ConfLiCt of Laws 135 (1st ed. 1916); see also duxbuRy, 
supra note 50, at 22-23. 
54. See duxbuRy, supra note 50, at 23.
55. Id. (quoting beaLe, supra note 53, at 148). 
56. duxbuRy, supra note 46, at 23 (quoting beaLe, supra note 49, at 153).
57. For Beale, only rarely would a statute be capable of “being assimilated into the common 
law”; more typically, a statute is “done by haphazard legislation by a legislature chosen 
not primarily for its wisdom.” Notes by Robert Lee Hale from Jurisprudence Lectures given by Joseph 
Henry Beale, 1909, 29 u. miami L. ReV. 281, 297-301 (1975). Langdell held the same views. See 
Grey, supra note 51, at 34-35 n.131. For a recent provocative treatment of legislation as a form 
of common law, see Jeffrey Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, ___ Va. 
L. ReV. ___ (forthcoming 2015) (arguing that the common law included a tradition for 
understanding legislation as a form of common law). 
58. John ChiPman GRay, the natuRe and souRCes of Law 84 (2nd ed. 1948, orig. pub. 1909).
59. Id. at 112 (discussing administrative rules) and 170 (discussing statutes). 
60. Id. (emphasis in original). For Gray, it is the finality and superiority of courts that makes 
their decisions “the Law,” and legislative and administration merely possible “sources” of it. 
Id. at 172. 
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Gray reaches the same conclusion with regard to administrative rules.61 This 
full submission of law under the mantle of judicial decisions also denies the 
core premise of the argument for teaching administrative law. 
A melding of these views can be seen in Roscoe Pound’s 1907 pointed 
challenge to administrative action.62 In the strongly worded essay, Pound 
canvasses with concern the vast areas of law that have been delegated to 
executive boards and commissions, often without a provision for judicial 
review, in areas of land and water rights, elections, the handling of the 
incarcerated, immigration, taxation, and the public health.63 Pound argues 
that the resurgence of these forms of administrative action is “one of those 
reversions to justice without law which are perennial in legal history and 
serve, whenever a legal system fails for the time being to fulfill its purpose.”64 
Indeed, for Pound, the reliance on executive actors or “executive justice” 
is fundamentally opposed to law, and inevitably makes individuals’ rights 
beholden to the arbitrariness of officials:
[Executive justice] is an attempt to adjust the relations of individuals 
with each other and with the State summarily, according to the notions of 
an executive officer for the time being as to what the public interest and a 
square deal demand, unincumbered [sic] by rules. The fact that it is justice 
without law is what commends it to a busy and a strenuous age. Hence we 
must attribute the popularity of executive justice chiefly, if not wholly, to 
defects in our present legal system; to the archaic organization of our courts, 
to cumbrous, ineffective and unbusinesslike procedure, and to the waste of 
time and money in the mere etiquette of justice which for historical reasons 
disfigures American practice. Executive justice is an evil. It has always been 
and it always will be crude and as variable as the personalities of officials.65
The contrast between Pound’s depiction of the growth of administration 
as a growth of this “extra-legal—if not anti-legal—element”66 and Wyman’s 
account of the internal law of administration could not be more stark. For 
61. Id. at 112; see Robert W. Gordon, The Case for (and Against) Harvard, 93 miCh. L. ReV. 1231, 1244 
(1994) (reviewing wiLLiam P. LaPiana, LoGiC and exPeRienCe: the oRiGins of modeRn 
ameRiCan LeGaL eduCation (1994)) (noting that a strain of Harvard scholars “did not 
even consider statutes and administrative decisions to be ‘law’ until and unless they were 
interpreted by a court”).
62. Roscoe Pound, Executive Justice, 55 am. Law ReGisteR (uniV. of Penn.) 137 (1907). 
63. Id. at 141-44. 
64. Id. at 144-45. 
65. Id. at 145. 
66. Id. at 139. The parallels between this essay of Pound’s and Philip Hamburger’s recent book, 
hambuRGeR, supra note 7, are striking. For instance, Hamburger writes in the vein of Pound’s 
Executive Justice, supra note 62, “What is more concretely at stake here is rule through and under 
law (or put another way, rule by and under law). Although the English, and then Americans, 
long struggled to preserve this sort of legal governance, it is exactly what prerogative and 
then administrative power evaded by working outside and above the law.” hambuRGeR, 
supra note 7, at 7 (emphasis in original).
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Pound, executive discretion constitutes lawlessness; for Wyman, discretion is 
a condition of not only the modern legal system—that “most of administration 
is with discretionary powers”67—but also one that will involve the overlap of 
administration and politics. Indeed, Wyman writes, “in the larger matters, 
questions of administration cannot be separated from questions of politics.”68 
But for Wyman, this overlap of administration and politics did not deny 
administration its status as law; on the contrary, Wyman invites study into the 
internal administrative law of the executive, including a national executive 
common law.69  
For one reason or another, Langdell, Beale, Grey, and Pound embraced 
views of law which put administrative action outside of its purview. Once the 
decisions and rules of administrative agencies are not understood as “law,” 
the argument for including a course in administrative law loses its motivating 
premise.
B. Can It Be Taught Through the Case Method?
Administrative law, at least as conceived by Goodnow, Freund, and 
Wyman, encompassed more than judicial decisions reviewing agency action.
But teaching a course including coverage of more than court decisions directly 
challenged the idea that law is to be taught solely through the case method. In 
this confrontation, the case method won.
The circumstances surrounding Freund’s teaching of administrative law at 
the University of Chicago provide a nice illustration of this clash. As part of 
the University of Chicago’s effort to establish a law school, Chicago’s first 
president, William R. Harper, arranged for one of Harvard Law School’s 
prominent professors, none other than Joseph Beale, to serve as the first dean at 
Chicago.70 As part of these early arrangements, Ernst Freund, who already had 
an appointment at Chicago as a professor of political science, had meetings 
with then-Professor Beale and Harvard’s Dean Ames to discuss the curriculum 
of the new law school, which Freund was to join.71 This meeting prompted a 
well-known letter from Dean Ames to President Harper on March 31, 1902.72 
In the letter, Dean Ames emphasizes his commitment to a case-based method 
of teaching in the context of warning Harper of Freund’s unconventional 
views:  
Our School is conspicuous for its belief in the learning of law by systematic 
study of Cases. If Professor Beale is to be Dean with the purpose of 
67. wyman, supra note 28, at 142.
68. Id. at 196 (internal citations omitted). 
69. Id. at 297. 
70. See Comment, Ernst Freund—Pioneer in Administrative Law, 29 u. Chi. ReV. 755 763-64 (1962) 
[hereinafter Ernst Freund—Pioneer].
71. Id.
72. Id. at 764-65 (reprinting the letter).
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reproducing the Harvard method, he must have a Faculty that believe in 
that method. Whether Professor Freund is convinced that this is the true way 
of studying law I do not know. I did not ask him his views on the point. 
Certainly his belief in the general methods of German Universities [sic], and 
his general views as to the function of a law-school would predispose him 
against a thoroughgoing belief in our methods.73
Beale emphasized these same points in his own letter to President Harper 
following the meeting with Freund.74 Beale asked for assurance that “no 
person shall teach in the school who does not frankly concur in adopting for 
the school the spirit and the methods of Harvard Law School.”75 He also made 
clear that the faculty should be “composed solely of persons who teach law in 
the strict sense of the word.”76
This strong reaction to Freund’s proposals responded to more than 
Freund’s views about administrative law, but they also had a decisive effect 
on it as well. Shortly after Beale’s arrival at Chicago in 1902, it was established 
that all instruction would be “entirely by the case method.”77 This had direct 
consequences for Freund’s teaching of administrative law. As William Chase 
reports, Dean Beale did not permit Freund to offer his administrative law 
course to law students in the school’s first year, restricting his enrollment to 
graduate students and undergraduates.78 “Not until the following year, when 
Freund had worked up a course based on cases, was he permitted to offer 
administrative law to law students. . . . ”79 While Freund’s eventual Cases on 
Administrative Law shows that he clearly embraced the case method as part of 
the pedagogy for law teaching,80 he did not understand all administration to 
be reducible to case-based instruction.81 In a similar spirit, Wyman’s extensive 
treatment of internal administrative law, existing largely outside the purview 
of reviewing courts, also suggests that understanding the operation of the 
administrative state requires looking beyond or outside of courts.82 But the 
vision of administrative law that could fit within the jurisprudence and 
73. Id. 
74. See id. at 766-67 n.40 (quoting letter from Dean Beale to Dr. Harper, April 2, 1902).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 766.
77. See Chase, supra note 8, at 57 (quoting Law School Faculty Minutes, 1902-27, item 1 (n.d.), p. 
3, University of Chicago Library).
78. Id. at 72. 
79. Id.
80. See Ernst Freund—Pioneer, supra note 70, at 768. 
81. See id. (describing a letter from Beale to Freund, wherein Beale wrote that he feared Freund 
would launch an assault on the case method of legal instruction if he became Dean of the 
University of Chicago’s new law school).
82. See generally wyman, supra note 28.
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pedagogy of the time was case-based, and focused exclusively on administrative 
law as the law of judicial control over and remedies from administration.  
Though Freund acquiesced in teaching administrative law as a course in 
judicial decisions, his dissatisfaction with this state of affairs shines through in 
comments he made many years later: “[T]he more favorable the attitude of the 
law school was to these subjects [including administrative law], the more they 
tended to become pure law school subjects…; but incidentally the evolution 
of these courses testifies to the absorbing and overmastering interest in the 
judicial aspect of any branch of law that is administered by the courts.”83
III. Lessons for a First-Year Legislation and Regulation Course
What lessons concerning adoption of a first-year “legislation and regulation” 
or “regulatory state” course can be gained from this brief tour of the history of 
administrative law and its early teaching? At a most general level, this history 
provides a cautionary tale of the ways in which abstract legal and pedagogical 
commitments can divert teaching away from the law as it exists in action and 
is practiced. As Robert W. Gordon observes, “[t]he consequence of these self-
imposed limits to the province of ‘pure’ law was that the schools deliberately 
kept their distance from a large and growing component of the work of their 
most successful graduates.”84 
This history thus provides clear guidance that the construction of the 
first-year curriculum should begin with a mapping of the work of lawyers in 
the modern legal system. This sounds obvious, but there remain surprising 
omissions. Perhaps most fundamental is the level of continued reliance on 
judicial decisions in courses on “legislation and regulation” and “regulatory 
state” instead of providing direct exposure to legislation and the materials 
produced by administrative agencies. The nonjudicial material that was 
cut away from Freund’s course and left out of versions of administrative 
law following Wyman’s lectures—legislation, the actual decisions and rules 
of agencies, and internal constraints on agencies operating independently 
from judicial review—still and even more urgently deserves a place in the 
curriculum.85 Bernard Schwartz pressed this point so forcefully in 1959 in the 
pages of this journal that I cannot resist quoting him at some length here: 
Doubt about the case method as the sole tool for teaching law is now fairly 
widespread in our law faculties. But the deficiencies of that method are 
particularly apparent in administrative law. The limitations upon the scope 
of judicial review in our system make a presentation of the administrative 
process solely through court decisions only a skeleton-like one. Unless 
administrative law students are to be placed in the position of Plato’s men, 
83. See Freund, Correlation, supra note 41, at 305-06. 
84. See Gordon, supra note 61, at 1244. 
85. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 619-22 (arguing that the advent of the regulatory state changed the 
content of law and the primary lawmaker and that first-year courses should address these 
changes). 
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who were chained in a cave and saw nothing but shadows, they must be given 
some direct acquaintance with the actualities of agency life itself. A week’s 
analysis of key decisions from the case law of an agency like the FCC would 
teach students more about the way the federal agencies really operate than a 
semester devoted exclusively to appellate court opinions.86
Based on the premise that law students, like lawyers, should confront primary 
sources of law in the regulatory state,87 it does not make sense to replicate the 
exclusive focus on judicial decisions in the newest addition to the curriculum, 
the first-year leg-reg course. The course should include materials from the 
legislative process, materials from rulemaking processes, agency adjudicative 
decisions, and guidance alongside judicial decisions on statutory interpretation 
and review of agency action, as Schwartz and his predecessors urged. At 
the very least, the course should require students to read an entire statute, a 
prominent piece of legislative history, such as a committee report, a notice of 
proposed rulemaking (NPRM), a final rule, an example of agency guidance, 
and an agency adjudicative decision. Moreover, a first-year leg-reg course is 
the right occasion to introduce students directly these nonjudicial materials, 
as this course is likely to be the only first-year course that provides direct and 
considered study of these nonjudicial sources.
As to pedagogical approach, these nonjudicial materials should be 
presented with the same pragmatic focus of judicial decisions. With court 
decisions, instruction emphasizes applicative judgment, pushing students to 
greater sophistication in arguing what prior judicial decisions stand for as they 
apply them to new fact patterns. So too with primary legislation and regulation 
materials. Instruction should emphasize how students interpret, argue from, 
and challenge the validity of these legal sources. To do that, students will have 
to be introduced to the basic legal tools that agencies rely upon in developing 
their positions, including how agencies engage in statutory interpretation and 
cost-benefit analysis, and how they use scientific and technical studies and 
gauge their political environment. In a sense, this approach places agency 
statutory implementation on par with judicial statutory construction; in both 
cases, law students need to understand the modes of analysis and vocabulary 
of legal justification, interpretation, and challenge. If agencies are the primary 
implementers of federal statutes, the first-year leg-reg course should treat them 
as such.
This approach also has advantages for the fit between the first-year leg-
reg course and upper-level courses in administrative law. Providing a robust 
overview of procedural forums of agency action as well as the legal operations 
that they involve would provide a groundwork for the upper-level course in 
administrative law, which would be an unapologetic study of judicial doctrines, 
teaching to a population that has already seen agencies in action in the first 
86. Bernard Schwartz, Oversight and Oversights in Administrative Law Teaching, 11 J. LeGaL eduC. 358, 
362 (1959). 
87.  Rubin, supra note 1, at 620. 
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year. A first-year course that provides more focus on the primary legal sources 
of regulatory state and relatively less emphasis on traditional judicial decisions 
taught in administrative law would reduce the problems of duplicate coverage 
between the first-year offering and upper-level administrative law, and, in time, 
uproot student perceptions that they need not take the upper-level course.88
A mapping of legal practice also reveals a tremendous volume of legal 
work involved in the everyday tasks of following regulatory law, tasks that fall 
under the label of “compliance” or “regulatory,” often identified with work 
under particular statutes or agencies. This work involves knitting together 
statutes, agency pronouncements and decisions of various kinds, including 
legislative rules, interpretive rules or guidance documents, adjudicative 
decisions, and other statements of particular effect. While current leg-reg 
courses provide a solid overview of statutory interpretation by courts, they 
do much less work with the interpretation of agency documents. Among the 
most important sources of law in the United States are the “legislative rules” or 
“regulations” produced by federal agencies through the notice-and-comment 
process.89 In other writing, I have argued that our jurisprudence has fallen 
behind in developing an approach to the interpretation of regulations.90 The 
interpretation of regulations is a central task in legal compliance work, and 
regulatory interpretation is also implicated in judicial review of the validity 
of those regulations and the validity of subsequent agency interpretations of 
them.91 According, treatment of the interpretation of regulations should take 
its place alongside statutory interpretation as one of the basic interpretive 
tasks confronting lawyers in our regulatory state. 
Conclusion
When the gap between law teaching and law in action becomes too great, 
“law as taught is mostly fiction.”92 The century-old dialogue about how to teach 
basic elements of administrative law—statutory and regulatory interpretation, 
an understanding of how agencies make law, and the doctrines of judicial 
review of agency action—illustrates how long the law as taught can remain 
88. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Ripple Effect of “Leg-Reg” on the Study of Legislation & Administrative Law 
in the Law School Curriculum, 65 J. LeGaL eduC. 121 (offering results of a survey on impact 
of introduction of 1L leg-reg offering on administrative law and legislation upper-level 
enrollments). 
89. For an admittedly crude measure of pages of the Federal Register of proposed and final 
rules, see maeVe P. CaRey, ConG. ReseaRCh seRV., R43056, CountinG ReGuLations: an 
oVeRView of RuLemakinG, tyPes of ReGuLations, and PaGes of the fedeRaL ReGisteR 17 
tbl 6 (2013). 
90. Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 miCh. L. ReV. 355 (2012). 
91. Id. at 367, 371 (arguing that application of Chevron and Auer/Seminole Rock requires the reviewing 
court to interpret the regulation, either to judge the regulation’s validity under Chevron or to 
assess the whether the agency’s interpretation is consistent with the regulation under Auer/
Seminole Rock). 
92. See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 363. 
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isolated from a positivist understanding of the law as practiced. First-year 
courses in “legislation and regulation” or the “regulatory state” are a critical 
opportunity to help reduce the gap between law teaching and law in action—
and to provide first-year students a foundation for more advanced study of 
specialized statutory and regulatory courses in the upper level. But to do so 
these courses must not shy away from providing direct exposure to the primary 
sources of law in the administrative state, sources beyond the judicial opinion.
Perhaps just as important, these courses give new prospects for shifting 
the image of the law that so profoundly shapes law students’ conceptions in 
their first year of law school. The commitment to the case method exacted 
a price for absorbing administrative law into the law school curriculum; it 
became a case-based course. Once this transformation occurred, teaching 
of administrative law did not provide a fulcrum for shifting the focus of law 
teaching to reflect the true dimension of the administrative state or lawyering 
within it. As a result, the traditional course in administrative law does much 
less than it otherwise might to shift law students’ “mental scenery of the law.”93 
The real challenge for our new courses in “legislation and regulation” and the 
“regulation state” may be to shift the scenery of law that students see, and thus 
their sense of what constitutes the norm and the peripheral among sources of 
law.
93. Felix Frankfurter, Book Review, 37 haRV. L. ReV. 638, 640 (1924) (reviewing eRnst fReund 
et aL., the GRowth of ameRiCan administRatiVe Law (1923)).
